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Back in September 2017, one of the present authors wrote about the High Court’s relocation appeal 
decision in F v L (Permission to Relocate: Appeal) [2017] EWHC 1377 (Fam), [2018] FLR 
(forthcoming), arguing that the case did not sit easily with established authorities in a number of 
respects (R George, ‘Relocation: A Spanner in the Holistic Analysis?’ [2017] Fam Law 1002). By 
coincidence, while that article was in press, an application through the Bar Pro Bono Unit came our 
way from the father in that case, who had successfully opposed the relocation in the Family Court 
but then lost on appeal in the High Court. He was seeking advice and representation for a second 
appeal to the Court of Appeal. Permission to appeal was granted by Macur LJ in September and the 
case came on for hearing in the Court of Appeal before Peter Jackson, Newey and Singh LJJ on 7 
December 2017. Judgment was handed down a couple of weeks later, allowing the appeal and 
restoring the trial judge’s decision: Re L (Relocation: Second Appeal) [2017] EWCA Civ 2121, 
[2018] FLR (forthcoming).  
Peter Jackson LJ opened by noting that this case was the first time that a second appeal had been 
heard in the Court of Appeal from a private law family case since the change to the rules in 2016 
which directed first appeals from Circuit Judges to the High Court. His Lordship then stated his 
overall conclusion at para 4:  
‘In the present case, my conclusion is that the decision of [the trial judge] HHJ Owens 
was not wrong or unjust in any way. Instead, the decision on appeal was regrettably both 
wrong and unjust because of serious procedural irregularity.’ 
Procedural history of the case  
Jackson LJ set out in some detail the basic framework for decision-making in private law children 
cases (paras 9-19). This was particularly relevant to the case as the main criticism levelled against 
the trial judge was that she had failed to make findings in relation to various allegations made by the 
mother, a decision which Russell J in the High Court had held amounted to an appealable error. This 
general framework was then set against what had actually happened in the present case at each stage, 
from FHDRA to DRA to Final Hearing, and then on appeal. Sections of the trial judge’s judgment 
were set out at length (quoted at paras 29-35), and the short appeal judgment was set out almost in its 
entirety (quoted at para 41). In para 42, Jackson LJ set out the grounds of appeal, namely that Russell 
J had been wrong to allow the appeal on the following bases:  
(1) in relation to her interpretation of the correct approach to determining an application for 
leave to remove;  
(2) in relation to what was said to be the necessity for the trial judge to make findings in 
respect of allegations of domestic abuse;  
  
(3) in relation to the circumstances when a shared care arrangement may be appropriate;  
(4) in relation to the extent to which the judge must justify departing from a Cafcass 
recommendation;  
(5) in relation to the need for the court to consider the effect of the departure of the UK from 
the EU. 
It is apparent, therefore, that although the case was at its heart a relocation dispute, the appeal raised 
a number of issues of broader relevance.  
Relocation 
In a way, the relocation law issue was one of the least interesting aspects of this case, as it was not 
disputed that Russell J had erred in her approach to relocation. In the High Court’s judgment, it had 
been said that it was necessary for a trial judge to decide first the question of child arrangements 
(including deciding on a main carer for the child), prior to making any determination about 
relocation. Jackson LJ set out that the arguments for the appellant in this regard were: 
 that Russell J’s approach was linear in nature, contrary to all recent authority on that 
issue;  
 that, contra Russell J, there was no authority for the proposition that the court had to 
determine care arrangements before considering an application for relocation; and  
 that requiring a judge to determine ‘a main carer’ was ‘outmoded and discriminatory in a 
way that this court has repeatedly sought to avoid’ (para 57).  
His Lordship regarded each of these submissions as ‘well-founded’ (para 58). Moreover, it had 
emerged from the investigation of the case in the Court of Appeal that the mother had not argued for 
this point before the High Court and the matter had not been the subject of argument before Russell 
J, and therefore it was a ‘serious procedural error’ for Russell J to have allowed the appeal on this 
basis (para 58). As Jackson LJ had earlier put it (para 4): 
‘The main basis on which the appeal was allowed by Russell J arose from a legal 
argument that had not been raised in the grounds of appeal, had not been addressed by 
either party, and was in any event incorrect.’ 
This part of the judgment in Re L therefore serves to restore the well-established approach to 
relocation set out in the earlier and leading authorities of K v K (International Relocation: Shared 
Care Arrangement) [2011] EWCA Civ 793, [2012] 2 FLR 880, Re F (A Child) (International 
Relocation Case) [2015] EWCA Civ 882, [2017] 1 FLR 979 and Re C (Internal Relocation) [2015] 
EWCA Civ 1305, [2017] 1 FLR 103. The only legal principle applicable to such cases is the welfare 
principle, and the court must adopt a holistic analysis which considers all the realistic options for the 
child’s future as part of the welfare assessment.  
Fact-finding 
Domestic abuse and fact-finding in relation to allegations is a topical subject, given the introduction 
of the revisions to Practice Direction 12J. Although those revisions were not in force when the 
original decision was taken in this case, the changes are not in fact material to the case, and Jackson 
LJ set out PD13J in its new form. As his Lordship said (para 61), PD12J provides ‘a clear and 
helpful framework to ensure that full consideration is given to the grave effects of domestic abuse, 
and that proper weight is given to abuse where it is proved’. However, as his Lordship went on to 
explain, almost all relationships have instances of bad behaviour during their breakdown, and it 
requires an exercise of judgment by the judge in each case to determine the necessary and 
proportionate approach to take to allegations. In this case, no fact-finding hearing had been ordered, 
and the trial judge had determined that she did not need to conduct a ‘detailed forensic examination’ 
  
of the particular allegations.  
Peter Jackson LJ considered (contra Russell J) that the judge had been entitled to adopt this 
approach, and that it was appropriate for her to have set that out at the start of the hearing so as to 
direct the evidence towards the central issues (para 67). His Lordship also accepted that the lack of 
specific findings of fact did not mean that the issues were ignored – as his Lordship put it (para 66):  
‘It would be a misconception to believe that because there was not a trial of each 
complaint made by these parents (were that possible), the Judge did not take into account 
the nature of their relationship.’  
This section of the judgment is important in making clear that judges are not required to conduct 
fact-finding exercises every time allegations are made. The key point, per the Practice Direction, is 
that judges need to give proper consideration to the nature and seriousness of any allegations, set 
against the issues in the case, so as to make a determination about the extent to which findings are 
necessary and proportionate to the decision.  
Shared care 
Russell J had criticised the trial judge for making a 50-50 shared care arrangement in circumstances 
where the parents did not get on. Her Ladyship had described this as being an ‘unsophisticated, over-
simplistic approach’ (High Court, para 11), and made this general comment:  
‘Splitting a child between two homes which are antagonistic and unsupportive of each 
other is not consistent with the best interests of a child nor congruent with that child’s 
welfare.’ 
The Court of Appeal rejected Russell J’s approach on two bases. First, the criticisms made of the 
trial judge were misplaced, as her judgment showed that she made the order based on her evaluation 
of the facts before her and not ‘in a weak attempt at even-handedness’ or due to her perception of the 
requirements of the 2014 amendments to the Children Act (para 73). Secondly, as to the general 
comment quoted above, that statement was ‘plainly wrong as a matter of law and goes beyond the 
proper role of the appeal court, which is to review the decision under appeal, not to substitute the 
view of the appeal court for that of the judge who heard the evidence’ (para 73).  
This section of the judgment serves as a reminder that the earlier approach to shared care 
arrangements, seen in cases like A v A (Shared Residence) [2004] EWHC 142, [2004] 1 FLR 1195; 
Re R (Residence: Shared Care: Children's Views) [2005] EWCA Civ 542, [2006] 1 FLR 491 and Re 
W (Shared Residence Order) [2009] EWCA Civ 370, [2009] 2 FLR 436, remains good law. Again, 
the only legal principle is welfare, with no presumptions, and the fact that the parents’ relationship is 
poor or marked by lack of communication does not, as a matter of principle, rule out a shared care 
arrangement for the child. It is a matter of fact, to be determined by the judge.  
Diverging from professional advice 
In this case, the trial judge departed from the Cafcass officer’s recommendation in two respects, both 
as to relocation and as to care arrangements. She gave reasons for doing so, but was criticised by the 
High Court on the basis that those reasons were ‘at best superficial’ (High Court, para 12). The Court 
of Appeal rejected this characterisation of the judge’s decision, saying that she had in fact gone 
‘some way beyond the necessary minimum’ (para 77). It is, ultimately, always the judge who makes 
the decision, and the requirement for departing from a professional or expert recommendation is only 
that an explanation is given – there is no presumption that a recommendation will be followed.  
  
Brexit 
Russell J criticised the trial judge for failing to consider the consequences of the UK’s departure 
from the EU as part of her decision-making in a case which involved two Italian national parents 
(though the child had both Italian and British nationality). The Court of Appeal said this (para 79):  
‘There are two reasons why this statement is unhelpful. In the first place, the reason why 
Brexit was not mentioned by the trial judge is because it was not mentioned in the 
evidence or submissions she heard. But secondly, and of more general application, the 
consequences of the UK’s departure from the EU are presently unclear, and there is no 
sound basis on which courts can factor in the hypothetical possibility that an EU 
national’s immigration position might at some future date become precarious. The task 
for trial judges of deciding these cases is difficult enough without adding imponderables 
of this kind.’ 
Comment 
Re L is an important case in a number of respects. It restores clarity to relocation cases when the 
High Court’s decision had sown the seeds of confusion, and it analyses clearly the approach that 
should be taken in all private law cases when allegations of domestic abuse are a feature of the 
evidence.  
Procedurally, the Court of Appeal also makes plain that the approach of the High Court in hearing 
appeals must be limited to a review of the trial judge’s decision, and must not involve the High Court 
substituting its own view for that of the original judge. As Singh LJ points out in his short concurring 
judgment, the approach under Pt 30 of the Family Procedure Rules (which govern appeals to the 
High Court) is equivalent to Pt 52 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and the meaning of the word 
‘wrong’ which governs both tests is set out in detail in the White Book. The same, of course, is true 
of appeals to Circuit Judges sitting in the Family Court, and so this case marks a timely reminder for 
all those hearing or litigating appeals as to the correct approach.  
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